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Space Reactor Arms Control
OVERVIEW
Joel R. Primack, Nancy E. Abrams, Steven Aftergood,
David W. Hafemeister, Daniel O. Hirsch. Robert Mozley,
Oleg F. Prilutsky, Stanislav N. Rodionov, and Roald Z.
Sagdeeva
Unshielded nuclear reactors provide the lightest and most survivable long-lived
sources of electric power available to support military satellites. Restricting their
use now, before a new generation of larger space reactors is tested and deployed
by the US and USSR, could help prevent an arms race in space.
Space nuclear power systems have been used by the United States and the
Soviet Union since the 1960s. The Soviet Union has used orbiting nuclear reactors
to power more than 30 radar ocean reconnaissance satellites (RORSATs). Two
RORSATs have accidentally re-entered and released their radioactivity into the
environment, and a third, Cosmos 1900, narrowly avoided a similar fate.
The United States is developing much more powerful space reactors, of which
the SP-100 is farthest along, primarily to power satellite components of the Strat-
egic Defense Initiative (SDI). A working group associated with the Federation of
American Scientists (FAS) and the Committee of Soviet Scientists for Peace and
Against the Nuclear Threat (CSS) has been studying a proposed ban on orbiting
reactors. A proposal by the FAS/CSS group that includes such a ban is attached in
the appendix to the Overview.
The first five papers in this section, all by members of the working group,
summarize the technological and historical background to nuclear power in space
and show that restrictions on orbiting reactors are verifiable. The final paper, by
Rosen and Schnyer of NASA, surveys the civilian uses of nuclear power in space.
The overview is a nontechnical introduction to the issues of space reactor arms
control, including the proposed ban on orbiting reactors.
a. See Notes and References for biographical Information
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The overview is a nontechnical introduction to the issues of space reactor
arms control, including the proposed ban on orbiting reactors.
BRIEF HISTORY
The United States launched the first space reactor, SNAP 10A, in 1965.
This small (500 watts electric) experimental reactor, like all subsequent
space reactors, was fueled by the rare chain-reacting isotope of uranium,
uranium-235. It operated for 43 days until an apparent electrical malfunc-
tion shut it down. It remains in a 1,300-kilometer orbit.1
The Soviet Union has launched at least 33 RORSAT (radar ocean
reconnaissance satellite) reactors, of which at least one did not reach
orbit. The reactor-powered radar in the RORSATs is used to locate US
naval forces;2 the US uses other methods to achieve similar goals. The
RORSATs are placed in very low orbit at an altitude of about 250 kilo-
meters. These low orbits are used apparently because radar effectiveness
falls off rapidly with distance—approximately as
R-4 = (R-2 down) x (R-2 back)
where R is the distance between source and reflector. Atmospheric drag
causes the orbits of even satellites of small cross-section to diminish
quickly at such low altitudes. This is why a compact reactor is used for
power rather than large solar panels.
When a RORSATs useful life is over, the reactor is supposed to be
boosted to a "nuclear safe" disposal orbit at approximately 950 kilometers.
At this altitude, re-entry will not normally occur for several hundred
years, by which time most of the radioactivity will have decayed.
Two of the RORSATs have re-entered accidentally when their booster
systems apparently failed. Cosmos 954 re-entered on 24 January 1978,
spreading radioactive debris over northern Canada. After the reactor boost
system on Cosmos 1402 failed, a new system was used to eject the fuel
core, which disintegrated in the upper atmosphere over the South Atlantic
Ocean on 7 February 1983.
Cosmos 1900 ceased to respond to radio commands in April 1988,
preventing boost to a disposal orbit. The decay of the Cosmos 1900 orbit
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was confirmed by Soviet and American sources on Friday 13 May 1988.3
On 30 September 1988, shortly before the satellite's expected re-entry, an
automatic backup system caused the reactor to be boosted to a high orbit.
The reactor aboard Cosmos 1900 apparently contained about 30 kilograms
of highly enriched uranium-235, producing about 75 kilowatts of thermal
power and perhaps 5 kilowatts electric/15
Counting Cosmos 954, 1402, and 1900, as well as the one or two
RORSAT launch failures, the accident rate for RORSATs is about 15
percent. This is comparable to the accident rate of US spacecraft carrying
radioactive nuclear power sources.8
Soviet reactor experts announced recently that the Soviet Union had
launched two experimental reactors of a new design into 800-kilometer
orbits (Cosmos 1818 on 1 February 1987 and Cosmos 1867 on 10 July
1987).7 These reactors generate electricity by in-core thermionic devices
that are more efficient than the thermoelectric generators (thermocouples)
used on the RORSAT reactors. They apparently produce about 10 kilo-
watts electric.
US SPACE REACTORS AND SDI
The United States built and ground-tested several nuclear reactors as
part of the Rover/NERVA program to develop a reactor-powered rocket in
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Several reactors for generation of electric
power in space were also designed, but until SDI there was little demand
for them.8
A National Academy study recommended in 1983—before SDI—that a
program to develop a 100-kilowatt electric space reactor be funded at an
annual level of $10-15 million.9 Current funding for this reactor program,
now called the SP-100, is ten times higher. According to Congressional
testimony by a senior DoE official10
...I would say that, frankly speaking, the major rebirth and driving factor [for
the space reactor program] is [President Reagan's] strategic defense initiative.
I think if it were not for that, we would be hard pressed to have a sufficient
number of defined missions to sustain it at the levels we're talking about
today.
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The deployment of space-based defenses against strategic missiles (as
proposed in SDI) or of antisatellite weapons (ASATs) could involve, among
other things, attack with directed-energy weapons (DEWs) such as lasers,
orbiting space mirrors (in conjunction with ground-based lasers), particle
beams, or hypervelocity guns—missions with large requirements for elec-
tric power. The power requirements of such orbiting battle stations can be
listed under three headings:
• Housekeeping under standby conditions, which includes spacecraft
inertial stabilization. One major power need is likely to be for cryogenic
refrigeration of chemical fuels.
• Alert mode, when the spacecraft is fully powered and maneuverable.
This might occur for many periods of hours or days during tests, exer-
cises, or crises. The total time in alert mode might be as much as a year
over the lifetime of the spacecraft.
• Burst mode, when the weapons are actually firing—possibly on hun-
dreds or thousands of targets in a period of perhaps a few hundred sec-
onds.
It is difficult to discuss the corresponding power requirements in the
absence of any specific SDI or ASAT design.
Housekeeping is likely to consume tens to hundreds of kilowatts of
electricity over a lifetime of perhaps 10 years, which could be supplied by
either solar cells or a nuclear reacfor.
Alert mode exercises might involve velocity changes due to rotations
or evasive maneuvers of the order of 10 meters per second for lasers,
mirrors, or other objects with masses of about a tonne (1,000 kilograms)
on timescales of a second, which implies a minimum power requirement
of about 100 kilowatts electric. Similar power requirements characterize
other alert mode activities.11 This would probably require reactor power
sources, especially if the spacecraft is supposed to be compact and hard-
ened against attack.
In burst mode, the power required to destroy one target each second
is likely to be of the order of 1,000 megawatts. If the total number of
targets each orbiting battle station is designed to attack is about 100,
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then allowing a factor of three for misses and an electric conversion
efficiency of about 10 percent, about 100 tonnes of high-power-density
chemical fuel such as beryllium burning in a fluorine atmosphere (30
megajoules per kilogram) should suffice.
One could use closed-cycle multi-megawatt reactors to power burst
mode operations, but they are likely to be extremely heavy, especially in
view of the requirement of rapid »energy conversion. However, open-cycle
reactors may be competitive with chemical energy sources in energy
storage density (energy output per unit mass).12 The strength of materials
limits energy storage in devices such as flywheels and magnets to con-
siderably less than 1 electron volt (eV) per atom, which is probably not
competitive in energy density with the best chemical fuels or open-cycle
reactors.
Thus, for SDI DEW satellites, reactors are being considered for burst
mode, could be useful for housekeeping, and might be essential for alert
mode. Former SDI director Lt. Gen. James Abrahamson said that space
nuclear reactors will be an essential component of the second phase of
SDI, and that without reactors in orbit, "that's going to be a long, long
lightcord that goes down to the surface of the Earth."13
This is the main justification for the SP-100 project, although its
current design power capacity of 2.5 megawatts thermal and 100 kilo-
watts electric may be too small for many SDI needs: several contracts
have recently been granted by the SDIO for the design of multi-megawatt
reactors.14
Studies by an American Physical Society group and the Congressional
Office of Technology Assessment have concurred that reactors are prob-
ably necessary for SDI.15-16 But a recent National Research Council study
has concluded that the technological challenges of building launchable
multi-megawatt reactors are truly formidable."
Since satellite-based directed energy weapons to attack ICBMs, if they
are possible at all, would have relatively short range, DEW battle stations
would have to be placed in low earth orbit (LEO—about 400 kilometers),
with orbital periods of 1.5-2 hours. In order to have these satellites over
enemy ICBM launching sites at all times, many, perhaps hundreds, would
be required. That means that many operating nuclear reactors, each many
times more powerful than the current RORSAT reactors, would be within
sight of almost every point on earth at all times.
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ARMS CONTROL ARGUMENTS FOR A BAN ON ORBITING REACTORS
A primary reason for our proposing a ban on orbiting reactors is to res-
trict the development and deployment of new weapons in space, particu-
larly destabilizing weapons for strategic defense or for anti-satellite ap-
plications. Because detection of operating reactors on earth satellites is
relatively easy (see below), a ban on orbiting reactors would be among the
most easily verifiable ways of supplementing and strengthening the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.18
President Carter proposed a ban on orbiting reactors in the wake of
the Cosmos 954 re-entry in 1978, but it was not accepted by the Soviet
Union. In view of the present strong interest of the Soviet government in
avoiding an arms race in space, now may be a good time to consider such
a ban again.
An FAS delegation was told by the responsible official at the Soviet
Foreign Ministry in September 198819
If the US government were to say to the USSR, let us consider neither of us
launching into outer space nuclear power, and such a matter were to be
mutual, it would be very seriously considered by the Soviet side.
It could be a good deal for both sides, trading off the US SDI invest-
ment in reactors against RORSATs and the larger orbiting reactors repor-
tedly under development in the USSR.20
It is possible that an agreement to ban orbiting reactors, if it is
achieved, would be part of a larger arms control package. For example,
restrictions on ASATs might also be included, particularly since the Soviet
RORSATs are the principal near-term target of the US ASAT program.
ENVIRONMENTAL AND NONPROLIFERATION REASONS FOR A BAN
There are many reasons beyond arms control to seek a ban on orbiting
reactors:
• As Cosmos 954 and 1402 have already demonstrated, re-entry of
reactors can cause radioactive contamination.
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• Accidental return of an intact reactor to the earth's surface because of
a launch failure or re-entry could allow recovery of enough highly en-
riched uranium-235 to make several fission bombs.
• Placing used reactors in "nuclear safe" disposal orbits exacerbates the
space debris problem.
• Operating orbiting reactors are a source of serious "light pollution" for
astronomical observations: they have been interfering with gamma-ray
astronomy for several years.
We will briefly take up each issue in turn.
Radioactive contamination
Since unused uranium-235 fuel is not radioactive, the environmental
contamination from a launch accident or abort would be minor, assuming
that space reactors are carefully designed to prevent a criticality accident
at launch and are turned on only after they are in orbit.
Once a reactor is turned on, the accumulation of long-lived radioactive
fission products is approximately proportional to its thermal power level
multiplied by its operating lifetime. The first generation of SP-1OO reac-
tors is designed to operate at about 2.5 megawatts (about 25 times the
Cosmos 1900 reactor's power) for seven years (about 20 times the operat-
ing life of a typical RORSAT), so a re-entering SP-100 could contain
several hundred times the long-lived radioactivity of a RORSAT reactor.
Since the environmental effects of this radioactivity would depend on
whether it is dispersed, where (for example, injection into the upper
atmosphere, or a particular surface location), and in what form (for ex-
ample, size of particles), they are very uncertain. However, they could
clearly be serious.21
Nuclear proliferation
Current designs call for the SP-100 to be fueled with approximately 200
kilograms of highly enriched uranium-235, 40 times the "formula quan-
tity" for which the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission requires special
safeguards. This is enough to construct a formidable arsenal of fission
bombs. Although the current SP-100 plans, which call for intact re-entry,
would mitigate radioactive contamination, they would exacerbate this
security problem.22
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The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has responded to
concerns about unplanned re-entry of orbiting reactors by proposing an
exploratory program called Space Intercept Rescue and Expulsion (SIREN)
to consider ideas for retrieving low-orbiting reactors or boosting them to
higher orbits. This will not be easy, since unshielded reactors are extrem-
ely radioactive, and a reactor that has suffered a malfunction may not
even be in one piece. Moreover, a satellite reactor that has had a critical-
ity accident, suffered a collision with another space object, or been at-
tacked by an antisatellite weapon could re-enter before there is time to
rescue it.
Space debris
The number of man-made objects orbiting the earth is increasing very
rapidly. The US North American Defense System (NORAD) is currently
tracking some 6,000 objects larger than 10 centimeters across, and an
MIT study recently estimated that there are 48,000 objects larger than 1
centimeter orbiting the earth.23 Since the relative speed of objects in orbit
is about 10 km/s, ten times the speed of a rifle bullet, collision with space
debris is a serious threat to satellites, including nuclear reactors. Accord-
ing to Nicholas Johnson24
The destruction of a radioactive satellite by hypervelocity collision not only
will make it impossible to dispose of the satellite in the future, but also may
create more immediate hazards to manned and unmanned satellites. A hyper-
velocity collision with a spent Soviet nuclear reactor may produce as many as
10* particles with a diameter of 1 millimeter or more.
It is evident that it is in the long run unacceptable to place spent
reactors in "nuclear safe" disposal orbits, where they exacerbate the space
debris problem.
Light pollution
Astronomers are attempting to detect faint signals from phenomena dis-
tant in space and time amid background radiation ("light pollution") that
has been growing rapidly near the earth because of activities such as
lighting and communications.
Orbiting reactors add significantly to this interference. They are very
bright sources of infrared (heat) radiation, since their conversion of heat
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to electric power is inefficient and most of the heat produced in the reac-
tor must be radiated into space.
Space reactors are also intense sources of neutrons and gamma rays
and are essentially unshielded except in the direction of the payload.
NASA has recently revealed that an instrument on the Solar Maxi-
mum Mission (SMM) satellite launched in 1980 has seen gamma rays
from the RORSATs and has also detected positrons (anti-electrons), which
are produced by high-energy reactor gamma rays in the outer reactor
casing.25 Some of these positrons are trapped in the earth's magnetic field,
effectively becoming an artificial radiation belt. When another spacecraft
passes through this cloud of positrons, the positrons annihilate with
electrons in the spacecraft's outer casing, and this produces penetrating
gamma rays. A gamma-ray burst experiment aboard the Japanese Ginga
satellite has also been disabled for about 20 percent of the time by
reactor-produced positrons. Positrons from orbiting reactors will also be a
serious problem for the Gamma Ray Observatory, a major American
astronomical satellite currently scheduled to be launched in 1990, and for
other satellites as well.
Space reactors are essentially unregulated
Despite these environmental problems and the accidents that have al-
ready occurred, there is essentially no regulatory mechanism for space
nuclear power. The United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space has promulgated several guidelines, but decisions are still largely
at the discretion of national governments. Within the US, there is no
procedure for licensing of space nuclear reactors, just classified review by
an Interagency Nuclear Safety Review Panel composed of representatives
of the sponsoring agencies, with only their final Safety Evaluation Report
made public. The simplest solution in the present case is a ban on orbit-
ing reactors.
CIVILIAN USES FOR SPACE NUCLEAR REACTORS
Nuclear reactors may well have essential roles to play in space. One
relatively near-term use seems especially appropriate: to provide power for
a manned lunar base. A reactor would have a considerably lower mass
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than the energy storage devices necessitated by the 14-day lunar night
that occurs at all locations but the lunar poles.28 A reactor to power a
manned lunar base would presumably be buried in the lunar soil for
shielding, and it would require pumping of coolant to radiators on the
lunar surface. Rather than attempt to use a space reactor design such as
SP-100, it would probably be better to design a reactor specifically for this
application.
Another civilian space application for which reactors are perhaps
essential is powering ambitious spacecraft to explore the outer reaches of
the solar system, where solar energy is very faint.
It is important to appreciate that a ban on orbiting reactors would not
prevent these nonmilitary projects, because they do not require reactors in
earth orbit. (A ban could include a provision allowing testing in earth
orbit of space reactors for deep-space applications.)
Figure 1 of the article in this issue by Rosen and Schnyer is a NASA
chart of many possible civilian applications for space reactors. Most are
on the moon, Mars, or in the outer solar system. However, missions in
earth orbit are also suggested to provide power for a space station com-
plex, a materials processing platform, air traffic control radar over the
oceans, communications platforms and bases in geosynchronous orbit, and
nuclear-electric orbital transfer vehicles. Below we comment briefly on
each of the proposed earth-orbit missions.
Space station
Nuclear power is not currently contemplated for the US space station,
which is instead to be solar powered by a combination of photovoltaic
cells and "solar dynamic" systems (converting heat focused on a collector
by mirrors to electricity using a working fluid).
In this application, any weight advantage of nuclear power would be
obviated by the need for massive shielding around the nuclear reactor to
prevent excessive irradiation of the crew, especially during extravehicular
activity and shuttle docking. Neutron shielding (by lithium hydride, for
example) is relatively low in mass; but the gamma shielding on all sides
of an SP-100 required to make the area safe for nearby human activity
would be equivalent to a shell of lead or tungsten about 20 centimeters
thick, which would have a mass of about 45,000 kilograms—more than 10
times the mass of the reactor, heat radiator, and supporting systems.
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Materials processing platform
That significant demand exists for large-scale materials processing in
microgravity remains to be demonstrated. In any case, the heat and
electric power requirements for materials processing could be met by solar
collectors and photovoltaic or solar dynamic power. The arguments against
nuclear power for space stations apply here too, at least for early-genera-
tion human-tended facilities.
Ocean Air Traffic Control Radar
Because the effectiveness of radar falls off so rapidly with distance, the
radars would have to be placed in low-earth rather than geosynchronous
orbit. As a result, many reactor-powered satellites might have to be in
orbit in order to have one or two continuously covering each of the major
air routes. A much simpler solution would be to require all aircraft to
have reliable transponders (which send a return signal that allows them
to be located, including information on altitude, etc., whenever they re-
ceive an appropriate interrogating signal).
Geosynchronous bases
The roughly 100 kilowatts electric contemplated for this application is
available from solar power, by scaling up the photovoltaic systems in
present use or utilizing the solar dynamic technologies being developed for
LEO space stations.
Orbital transfer vehicles
Electric or magnetic fields can be used to accelerate the ionized rocket
propellant to higher velocities than are attainable with chemical reactions,
thus requiring less mass of propellant. Because of the limited power of
the reactor, such space tugboats would have relatively slow acceleration,
but the concept is potentially attractive. However, solar-electric power is a
potential alternative to nuclear. It might be worthwhile, as another alter-
native, to design thermal-propulsion systems in which sunlight concentrat-
ed on a tungsten heat collector heats it to a temperature of 3,000 K. The
corresponding thermal velocity imparted to hydrogen propellant is about 7
kilometers per second. The specific impulse Iv is a quite respectable 700
seconds, better than the best chemical fuels.27
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We conclude that alternatives to nuclear reactors for power can be
found for all attractive near-term civilian missions in earth orbit. Indeed,
according to recent preliminary studies at the Soviet Space Research
Institute (IKI), there is good reason to believe that solar energy would be
the safest and most reliable power source for missions as far as Mars.28 It
would only be beyond Mars that the sun would become too dim to power
spacecraft.
In view of the uncertainty of future developments in technology, it
would probably be best to plan to review and, if necessary, renegotiate
any restriction on space reactors after a decade or two.
We have also tried to ascertain whether there are any reconnaissance
or military intelligence missions that are potentially important for nation-
al security that require reactors in earth orbit.
No such mission has been described to us in numerous discussions
with experienced active and retired military personnel and prominent
scientific staff and advisers. Indeed, several very knowledgeable people
have told us that in their opinion the ban on orbiting reactors that we
have proposed would not compromise the national security of either side.
VERIFIAB1LITY OF THE PROPOSED BAN
Several papers below describe the possible verification of a ban on reac-
tors in orbit in considerable technical detail. On the basis of these papers,
our conclusion is that such a ban would be verifiable. Space is an exposed
environment, and a powerful reactor is essentially impossible to hide.
The most readily detectable signal from an operating reactor is its
thermal radiation, largely in the infrared but partly in the visible part of
the spectrum. At the design temperature of 800 K, the 100 square meters
of heat radiators on SP-100, for example, would have a deep red glow.
Although the atmosphere is opaque to most infrared radiation, there
are "transparency windows" that allow detection from the ground or from
an infrared telescope on an airplane. Even with the Air Force Maui Opti-
cal Station (AMOS) equipment, which no longer represents state-of-the-art
technology, an operating reactor could be rapidly detected far beyond
geosynchronous altitude (40,000 kilometers).29
Although infrared verification is perhaps adequate by itself, detection
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of nuclear emissions would confirm that a detected infrared source is
actually a reactor. As noted above, it was recently revealed that the
mature technology represented by the US Solar Maximum Mission Gam-
ma Ray Spectrometer has routinely detected gamma rays and positrons
from RORSATs, and we have calculated that the more sensitive detectors
soon to be available such as the Compton Telescope (COMPTEL) on the
Gamma Ray Observatory will reliably detect even a shielded reactor.30
If desired, in addition to the small number of sensitive gamma-ray
detectors on satellites in orbit for astronomical purposes, a number of
light and inexpensive gamma-ray detectors could be placed on spacecraft
in a variety of orbits specifically to monitor compliance with a ban on
reactors in earth orbit.
Neutrons from a reactor can also be detected in principle at distances
of many thousands of kilometers by appropriately designed detectors.31
Detecting reactors that are placed in orbit but never turned on would
be much more difficult than detecting operating or recently operating
reactors. The best way to counter such a "breakout" threat would probably
be to inspect space payloads before launch. But until high-powered reac-
tors have been thoroughly tested in space, it is extremely unlikely that
billions of dollars or rubles would be spent launching them with the
associated equipment that they are supposed to power. As we have dis-
cussed, the tests could be detected.
ALTERNATIVE REGIMES FOR REGULATING REACTORS IN SPACE
There are different approaches to restrictions on space reactors that might
be considered in negotiations between our respective governments. We
include here a brief discussion of four alternative versions of a ban on
orbiting reactors. They are summarized in the table.
Before describing these four regimes, however, we begin by summariz-
ing the basic arguments against reactors in orbit that these alternatives
attempt to address:
• Reactors are probably essential to power the "alert modes" of certain
categories of space-based weapons, including several varieties of
antiballistic missile weapons.
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• About 15 percent of past space reactors have been involved in acci-
dents or failures. If orbiting reactors re-enter, they can cause environmen-
tal contamination and, if they do not disintegrate on re-entry, they can
present anyone able to salvage them with enough uranium-235 for several
nuclear weapons.
• "Nuclear safe" orbits are not really safe. There are already thousands
of pieces of space debris orbiting the earth, endangering satellites and
astronauts, and contributing to a planetary halo of debris whose creation
our descendants will doubtless regret.
Table 1: Alternative Regimes for Regulating Reactors in Space
1
Ban all
space reactors
for 15 years
Bans RORSATS
Constrains SDI
Eliminates breakout
threat
Prevents reactor
re-entry
Avoids orbital
debris
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Reactors OK for t
moon and deep space
Protects gamma-rav
astronomy
Legally clear
r yes
yes
II
Ban orbital
reactors;
Testing OK
for deep space
yes
yes
no
yes*
most
yes
largely
?
Ill
Ban reactors
In low orbit';
permit only
civilian uses
above
yes
yes
no
yes*
no
yes
no
no
IV
Ban reactors
in low orbit
only
yes
?
no
yes*
no
yes
no
yes
* Low orbit means orbits less than 800-kilometer altitudes
t Except for collisions
t No lunar or deep-space missions using reactors are planned for this period
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Alternative I: BAN ALL SPACE REACTORS FOR A DEFINED PERIOD
This regime has the virtues of comprehensiveness and simplicity. It would
prevent breakout (sudden abrogation of an arms control treaty causing a
serious military threat) by allowing no exceptions for reactors for lunar
and outer solar-system missions—or for the testing of the latter category
of reactors in earth orbit. To strengthen the protection against breakout,
such a ban might also exclude tests in space of major components of
space reactor systems such as heat radiators.
After the denned period—say 15 years—the agreement would be up
for renegotiation if necessary. This would allow for consideration of politi-
cal or technological developments.
The potential problem with this proposal is that it may be too com-
prehensive. While dragnet measures may succeed in eliminating their
targets, they may also eliminate more than they need to.
Alternative II: BAN ORBITAL REACTORS; ALLOW TESTING FOR LUNAR AND
DEEP-SPACE APPLICATIONS
This is the version of a space reactor ban included in the FAS/CSS propo-
sal (see appendix).32 But it might permit a reactor tested in orbit under
the guise of a deep-space probe to provide the technological basis for a
breakout from the ban of reactor-powered space weapons.
Although both (I) and (II) prevent civilian uses of reactors in orbit, it is
unclear whether such uses exist. One possible way of dealing with this
uncertainty would be to make the ban renegotiable after 10-15 years,
since such uses will not be occurring in this period anyway.
Alternative III: BAN REACTORS IN LOW ( < 800 km) ORBIT;
PERMIT ONLY CIVILIAN USES ABOVE
Although this regime deals with some of the environmental problems, it is
based on the "nuclear safe" orbit idea that we find dubious, it would
permit orbiting reactors that could seriously hamper gamma-ray astron-
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omy, and it does not adequately address the arms control concerns.83
Alternative IV: BAN REACTORS IN LOW ORBIT ONLY
This alternative addresses primarily the environmental issue. It is simpler
than (III), since it does not require agreement as to what functions are
appropriate for high orbit, but it does not prevent any military uses of
higher orbits, including Strategic Defense.
Both alternatives (I) and (II) would effectively address the arms control
objectives of a ban on orbiting reactors.
CONCLUSION
Most people are shocked to learn that there are already more than thirty
nuclear reactors constantly orbiting over our heads, including deactivated
but still radioactive reactors that have been boosted to a dumping altitude
at which they join thousands of other pieces of space-age debris all orbit-
ing at 25,000 kilometers per hour. A collision with any substantial chunk
of this debris could knock pieces of a spent reactor out of orbit and down
to earth long before its scheduled re-entry hundreds of years from now.
An agreement to stop putting reactors in orbit would eliminate this
threat, and have very substantial arms control benefits as well. It would
stop the Soviet RORSATs, and thereby eliminate a principal US incentive
to develop ASATs. And it would significantly constrain SDL
SDI is an elusive target for arms controllers. Bans on many of its
components could be difficult to verify. But space-based SDI battle sta-
tions may have an arms-control Achilles heel in the reactors that are
probably required to power them.
A ban on reactors in earth orbit may therefore be an important con-
tribution to the prevention of a space arms race.
Space is the largest arena for human endeavors, and one that is only
beginning to be militarized and polluted. It has long been recognized that
nuclear power has dangers that require regulation. We believe that the
time is now ripe for an agreement to ban nuclear reactors from orbit.
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APPENDIX: THE MAY 1988 PROPOSAL BY THE FAS AND CSS
The proposal which we put forward on behalf of our two organizations (after two
joint workshops) to ban nuclear power in earth orbit grows out of our efforts to
prevent both the radioactive contamination of the earth's surface and the exten-
sion of the arms race into space. In particular, this agreement would prevent the
use of reactors in earth orbit by either side for any purpose—whether offensive or
defensive, including the use of reactors to power surveillance satellites.
The use of nuclear power in space is still at an early stage but already there
have been accidents which have caused worldwide concern.
An agreement to ban nuclear reactors from orbit would be a major barrier to
any future arms race in space since nuclear reactors are compact sources of large
quantities of power necessary for many military purposes. Meanwhile, as far as
civilian activities are concerned, solar energy collectors and fuel cells will be a
more convenient and safer source of energy in earth orbit for the foreseeable
future. Energy sources powered by quantities of radioisotopes below an agreed safe
threshold could also be permitted for these purposes.
The ban on reactors in orbit would not prevent the use of nuclear power for
deep space scientific or exploratory missions with associated very limited tests
under agreed safeguards of such deep-space reactors in earth orbit.
Verification of a ban on nuclear power in orbit would be relatively straight-
forward because an operating (or even recently operating) nuclear power source
would emit large amounts of detectable infrared, gamma and neutron radiation.
We therefore call for an international agreement to ban nuclear power in orbit
and our two organizations plan to continue to work on the technical aspects of
this ban in the context of our five-year Joint Verification Project.
Roald Sagdeev
chairman
Committee of Soviet Scientists
for Peace and Against the Nuclear
Threat
Frank von Hippel
chairman of the research arm of the
Federation of American
Scientists
13 May 1988
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The requirement inherent in this alternative of defining both an appropriate
orbital limit and appropriate functions for nuclear-powered satellites creates
serious legal problems. No consensus has ever been reached in COPUOS on these
definitions.
